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We examine the dynamic impact of liquidity shocks resonating in stock and housing markets
on real GDP growth. We fit a Bayesian time-varying parameter VAR model with stochastic
volatility to US data from 1970 to 2014. GDP becomes highly sensitive to house market
liquidity shocks as disruptions in the sector start to emerge, yet more resilient to stock market
liquidity shocks throughout time. We provide substantial evidence in favour of asymmetric
responses of GDP growth both across the business cycle, and among business cycle troughs.
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1 Introduction
The links between asset markets and macroeconomic fluctuations are the subject of lengthy
debate (see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1988)). In light of the 2008 recession (i.e. the Great
Recession), liquidity provision is becoming a central topic (see Adrian and Shin (2008); Acharya
et al. (2011); Næs et al. (2011)).
The prime contribution of this paper is to assess the effects of liquidity shocks stemming
from stock and house markets on GDP growth throughout time. Our empirical study examines
the impact of liquidity shocks for the US economy from 1970 to 2014. Our sample captures
prosperous and recessionary periods; as well as the recovery period following the financial crisis.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no document of an empirical investigation on the effects
of liquidity shocks on the real economy. In fact the majority of the literature concentrates on
explanatory and forecasting performance (e.g. Næs et al. (2011) and Florackis et al. (2014)).
The importance of understanding the dynamics of liquidity shocks and the real economy is
twofold. First, the structural links between asset market liquidity and the real economy may
be dependent on the business cycle. Second, model misspecification can result in erroneous
inference and policy recommendations.
There are various reasons why liquidity conditions in stock and housing markets can affect
the real economy. Stock market liquidity may behave as a signalling process uncovering the
information set of investors (Florackis et al., 2014). In times of excess volatility or diminishing
confidence regarding the future state of the economy, investors adjust portfolio holdings mov-
ing funds from high risk assets into ‘safe havens’ such as government debt or other short-term
fixed income securities (flight to safety). Furthermore if investors expect a negative liquidity
shock, portfolio compositions mirror this and greater proportions of wealth move into liquid as-
sets (flight to liquidity); Longstaff (2004). Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) develop a model
where the provider’s ability to supply liquidity depends upon their capital and margin require-
ments. During periods of financial stress, market liquidity is sensitive to movements in funding
conditions leading to mutually reinforcing “liquidity spirals”. A “margin spiral” transpires when
a shock to funding liquidity results in higher margins, and in turn, tightens speculators’ funding
constraints. This compels traders to de–lever and provide liquidity to low margin stocks. A
“loss spiral” occurs when speculators hold large initial positions that negatively co-vary with
customers’ demand shocks. A shock to funding liquidity causes speculators to sell more and
further reduces prices. Levine and Zervos (1998) propose that investment channels within a
liquid secondary market facilitate investment into long-run, generally less liquid, projects that
enhance long-term productivity; and subsequently economic growth.
Housing also plays multiple roles in affecting the real economy. First, houses can return
capital gains or losses as an asset that directly influence housing wealth. Campbell and Cocco
(2007) establish that increases in housing wealth relax borrowing constraints and fuel consump-
tion growth. Similarly Carroll et al. (1992) argue from a precautionary savings motive, that
increases in the value of housing wealth increase consumption expenditure. Second, housing can
catalyse inter-temporal consumption when credit markets are imperfect. Housing is a pledge-
able asset; He et al. (2015) indicate that house prices contain a liquidity premium. Therefore,
in equilibrium, people may be willing to pay more than the house’s fundamental value because
of the financial security this conveys when they need a loan. Moreover purchasing a house
requires a sizeable down payment, therefore the buyer’s liquidity affects the demand for housing
(Stein, 1995). Thus, strong demand in the housing market requires an extensive base of liquid-
ity. Factors contributing to the notion of a housing bubble prior to the Great Recession are:
substantial increases in trading volumes, surging prices and, mortgage defaults. With regards
to the latter, Mian et al. (2015) states “when major shocks hit the economy and millions of
homeowners simultaneously default . . . sales of foreclosed homes could lead to further reductions
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in house prices, threatening real activity” page 25871.
Our main results stem from a Bayesian time-varying parameter VAR model with a stochastic
volatility structure. Our model allows for time variation in the autoregressive parameters,
structural shocks, contemporaneous relations and the stochastic volatility innovations. We
provide robust evidence that stock market liquidity shocks yield sharp contractions to GDP
growth. However, the magnitude of the impact is declining. Contrastingly, we document a
remarkable structural change between house market liquidity and GDP growth as frictions in
the property sector surface in 2005. Our analysis reveals that house market liquidity shocks
are most damaging during the depths of the Great Recession. We provide substantial evidence
supporting an asymmetric response of GDP to house market liquidity shocks over the business
cycle and across business cycle troughs in our sample. We further show that structural stock
market and house market liquidity shocks explain, on average, 17% and 35% of the overall
variation in GDP growth during the Great Recession. Then, in the period following the Great
Recession (i.e. 2009–2014), house market liquidity shocks contribute, on average, 46% to the
overall variation in real GDP growth. This implies the fragile recovery in the US is partly
attributable to imbalances within the property sector.
Our study aims to contribute to the existing literature in several ways. From a theoretical
perspective, our results correspond with the liquidity shock hypothesis in Kiyotaki and Moore
(2012). This refers to sudden drops in asset market liquidity that may or may not relate to
macroeconomic fundamentals, causing equity prices to fall. Lower asset prices hinder firm’s
financing abilities through issuing new equities and/or using equity as collateral. Therefore,
investment deteriorates, output falls and recession begins. However, in discussing the financial
crisis, there is recognition that liquidity conditions in stock and housing markets are both coun-
tercyclical with the business cycle (see among others, Jermann and Quadrini (2012); Jaccard
(2013); Diaz and Jerez (2013)). The innate appeal of the liquidity shock hypothesis corresponds
particularly well with recent business cycles. If asset market liquidity is a causal factor, policy-
makers can impede the cycle through the direct provision of liquidity to support investment.
The empirical literature is relatively small (but growing) with regards to the role of asset
markets for the macroeconomy in a time-varying framework (see, among others Balke (2000),
Davig and Hakkio (2010), Eickmeier et al. (2015), Abbate et al. (2016)). In general, results on
the time-variation of financial shocks are not conflicting; the volatilities of structural financial
shocks evolve throughout time. A possible explanation is that a financial shock simultane-
ously effects financial intermediaries, credit conditions and segments of the financial market2.
However, an abundance of literature accounts for financial conditions through one variable; typ-
ically a “financial conditions” aggregate. Hubrich and Tetlow (2015) emphasise the existence
of an episodic relationship between the macroeconomy and financial factors limits the amount
of economically (and statistically) significant evidence within the literature. They estimate a
Bayesian Markov-Switching VAR model using US data and analyse the effects of financial shocks
using the Financial Stress Index. Time-variation is shown to be significant and economically
meaningful for financial shocks during “stress events”.
However, aggregating conditions from different financial markets omits any interaction be-
tween financial variables. Implicitly, this ignores important contemporaneous structural links
between asset markets. The empirical literature allowing for different financial markets in a
VAR framework is small (see e.g Bjo¨rnland and Leitemo (2009) and Prieto et al. (2016)). Our
works extends upon Prieto et al. (2016), who evaluate the effects of asset price shocks to US
GDP growth in a time-varying framework. We build on their analysis by isolating the liquidity
component from stock and house prices overcoming the complex web of information that nests
1A mortgage contract gives the lender the right to foreclose on a home should the buyer default on repayment
obligations.
2In particular, this general consensus corroborates with the findings of Stock and Watson (2012) who note
that the size of the financial shocks were drivers of the financial crisis.
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within asset prices (Harvey, 1988).
Conceptually, our work relates to the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilbirium (DSGE)
literature focussing on financial shocks. Shi (2015) deduces a tractable model able to quantify
the effects of financial shocks for the business cycle. Negative shocks to asset liquidity are shown
to cause investment, consumption and output to fall. Jaccard (2013) calibrates a DSGE model
on Euro area data and evaluates the Great Recession by computing the relative contribution of
liquidity shocks. Results imply that the sharp contraction in output was mainly due to negative
liquidity shocks originating in the financial sector. Christiano et al. (2010) show that ‘financial
factors’ are key drivers of economic fluctuations. Their main results show that risk shocks–
affecting the economy through the investment margin–are the main factor behind economic
variations explaining more than 60% of the volatility in US investment; and a third of investment
volatility in the Euro area. Furthermore, liquidity shocks display drastic effects on real activity.
In particular these shocks reveal a contraction of between 1/3 and 1.5 percentage points in US
GDP growth.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 shows how we measure liquidity and provides a
description of the macroeconomic data. In Section 3, we discuss TVP VARs, prior specification
and identification of structural shocks. Empirical analysis and robustness checks are in Sections
4 and 5 respectively. Finally, Section 6 provides concluding comments.
2 Measuring Liquidity and Data
For our benchmark analysis, we rely on the Return-to-Volume (RtoV) ratio of Amihud (2002)
to measure market liquidity. This ratio captures the price response to $1 trading volume and
rests on the theoretical foundation of Kyle’s price impact coefficient (Kyle, 1985). Specifically,
the price impact coefficient encapsulates the sensitivity of asset prices to the order flow. Ami-
hud (2002) notes that the RtoV ratio is more coarse and less accurate than finer measures of
liquidity; such as bid–ask spreads or transaction–by–transaction market impacts. Yet these
finer measures of liquidity require vast amounts of high–frequency microstructure data that are
not readily available for long periods of time. Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) and Sadka (2006)
propose alternative measures of stock market liquidity that capture price impact3 4. Goyenko
et al. (2009) provide a comprehensive analysis of an array of high and low frequency liquidity
measures. Their findings reveal that the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity proxy, among
other proxies thought to capture price impact, are dominated by the Amihud (2002) ratio.
In fact, Goyenko et al. (2009) “suggest using the Amihud measure... if a researcher wants to
capture price impact”, page 179.
Furthermore the Amihud (2002) ratio, and implicitly price impact, links well with the models
in Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), Jaccard (2013) and Shi (2015). Investing entrepreneurs sell their
3In contrast to the Amihud (2002) ratio, increases in the aforementioned constitute a rise in liquidity. Both
the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) and Sadka (2006) liquidity measures are available from the Centre for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The former and latter are available from 1962 to 2015 and 1983 to 2008,
respectively. The contemporaneous correlations between our measure of stock market liquidity and Pastor and
Stambaugh’s and Sadka’s measures are -0.38 and -0.36, respectively. As an additional robustness check we have
used the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) proxy as our measure for stock market liquidity. Results and conclusions
are generally consistent to those we report in this paper and are available on request. We have also estimated
our benchmark models using the Return-to-Turnover ratio proposed in Florackis et al. (2011). These results are
consistent with those we present in the paper.
4Other measures of liquidity are found in Lesmond et al. (1999) and Roll (1984). Lesmond et al. (1999) and
Roll (1984) propose a measure of liquidity based on the frequency of zero returns to proxy an implicit trading
cost and an effective spread estimate that depends on the autocovariances of successive returns, respectively. The
benefits of both measures are that they require only daily returns. Another widely used measure of liquidity is
the relative spread. However, CRSP data to compute the relative spread is only fully available from 1980 which
is too short to use in our study. Næs et al. (2011) provide correlations between the Amihud (2002) ratio and
the Lesmond et al. (1999) and Roll (1984) liquidity measures of 0.38 and 0.32 respectively. These measures of
liquidity are positively correlated since increases capture a decline to market liquidity.
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holdings to liquid assets to finance investments due to borrowing constraints. Consequently
liquidity relates to the resaleability of assets. The RtoV ratio assumes changes to asset prices
depend on the net order flow. Successive orders change the cost of trading which therefore
influence the ease of reselling assets. As prices become more sensitive to the order flow, the ease
of selling assets declines. In turn the cost of trading increases causing investment to dwindle
and output falls.
Adding to this, there is no data available to calculate alternative liquidity measures, such
as bid-ask spreads, for the property sector. Therefore, our choice of the Amihud (2002) ratio
not only ensures a consistent definition (and measure) of liquidity from both stock and housing
markets, but also corresponds well with the causal chain from liquidity shocks to GDP growth
outlined in the existing theoretical literature.
We proxy stock market liquidity, RtoV st as:
RtoV st =
1
NY
Y∑
n=1
|ri,t|
V OLi,t
(1)
where |ri,t| is the absolute return of stock i on day t, V OLi,t is stock i’s trading volume (in
units of currency) on day t, Y is the number of days within each trading quarter. An increase
in RtoV st constitutes a decline in liquidity.
To calculate stock market liquidity, we use daily stock price and trading volume data for all
common stocks on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from the CRSP database over the
time period 1968 to 2014. We implement standard filtering criteria similar to Amihud (2002)5.
In a similar manner, we estimate house market liquidity, RtoV ht as:
RtoV ht =
|∆ht|
V OLt
(2)
where |∆ht| is the absolute quarterly change in house prices in quarter t (i.e. house price
inflation) and V OLt is the trading volume (in thousands of units of currency) of houses. We
use the Nominal Home Price Index to proxy prices which tracks the prices of single-family homes
and is from Robert J. Shiller’s webpage. Trading volume is the sum of the volume of sales of
new single-family homes and existing single-family homes (available from Thomson Reuters
DataStream)6. In Appendix A, we report descriptive statistics of the raw estimates of RtoV st
and RtoV ht .
Our estimation sample spans from 1970 to 2014 and is purely down to data availability.
We cover four National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recessionary periods, including
the Great Recession. We gather US economic data on inflation (using the GDP deflator), real
GDP and the Federal Funds rate from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We convert
inflation and GDP into annual growth rates using logarithmic differences. Using a one-sided
Kalman filter, we de-trend inflation as in Stock and Watson (1999). The trend captures inflation
5Specifically, we admit stocks into our estimate if they have at least 200 days of return and trading volume
data in the previous year. We also omit stocks with a price less than $5 at the end of the previous year. Finally,
we eliminate outliers by removing stock’s whose liquidity estimate is in the top and bottom 5% tails of the
distribution for the current year (after satisfying the former criterion). Note, results and conclusions remain the
same when we eliminate the top and bottom 1% tails of the distribution which is consistent with the filtering
criteria in Amihud (2002). We calculate the liquidity measure for each quarter and each security, then take an
equally weighted average over the cross section of securities. To calculate our stock market liquidity proxy, we
include between 986 and 2613 stocks in each year; the average number of stocks estimating market liquidity is
1805 per year respectively.
6Available from http://www.econ.yale.edu/˜shiller/data.htm. From 1975, the Nominal Home Price Index
uses Case and Shiller’s national house price index that gathers data from the nine US census constituents for
single family homes. Before 1975, this index uses the purchasing component of the US Consumer Price Index.
Trading volume data is the number of sales of single family homes from the nine constituents (in thousands). To
convert into thousands of units of currency we multiply trading volume by the median house price for the USA
available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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expectations and is thought to alleviate price puzzles (Prieto et al., 2016). We transform our
liquidity proxies into % deviations from their respective 3–year moving averages; denoting as
Silliqt , H
illiq
t respectively; Figure 1 plots our data series.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our macroeconomic and financial data. On average
US GDP growth is around 2.75%, it peaks in 1984 at 8.2% and troughs in the depths of
the most recent recession at -4.15% (i.e. 2009Q2). House and stock market illiquidity, on
average, fluctuate 6.63% and 11.53% below their respective 3–year moving averages. Both
measures peak as liquidity dries up during the Great Recession in 2008Q4 at 166.55% and
267.17% respectively. The contemporaneous correlation between GDP growth and stock market
and house market illiquidity are -0.35 and -0.05 respectively. Negative correlations with real
GDP growth are intuitive, an increase in the Amihud (2002) measure corresponds to worsening
liquidity conditions (i.e. the market is more illiquid).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Macroeconomic Data and Illiquidity Proxies from
1970 to 2014
pit yt it H
illiq
t S
illiq
t
Mean -0.036 2.751 5.571 -6.632 -11.533
Median 0.047 2.958 5.3 -8.716 -22.933
Max 2.291 8.204 17.79 166.548 267.171
Min -2.627 -4.147 0.07 -99.566 -62.765
Std.Dev. 0.856 2.22 3.867 49.134 42.411
Skew -0.532 -0.583 0.676 0.671 2.662
Kurt 4.199 3.715 3.537 4.082 14.186
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for US
macroeconomic data from 1970Q4-2014Q4 respectively. pit
is the annual rate of GDP deflator inflation. This has been
de-trended using a one-sided Kalman filter as in Stock and
Watson (1999); yt is the annual rate of real GDP growth; it
is the Federal Funds rate; Hilliqt is house market illiquidity
expressed as the % deviation from its 3–year moving average
and Silliqt is stock market illiquidity which is also expressed
as the % deviation from its 3–year moving average.
To illustrate, Figure 2 depicts the annual rate of GDP growth along with our proxies of
stock and house market liquidity conditions, the Amihud (2002) measure, from 2000 to 2014
respectively. Clearly, we can see that liquidity (illiquidity) is countercyclical (procyclical) with
real GDP growth. In particular, liquidity dries up in late 2008–corresponding with the peaks
in our stock and house market illiquidity proxies–and these lead the slump in GDP growth by
around 1–2 quarters in early 2009.
5
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Figure 1: Macroeconomic and Financial Variables from 1970 to 2014
Notes: This figure plots the annual rate of US inflation, pit; annual real GDP growth, yt; the Federal
Funds rate, it; House Market Illiquidity, Hilliqt and Stock Market Illiquidity, S
illiq
t . We detrend the
annual inflation rate, using a one-sided Kalman filter as in Stock and Watson (1999). Our liquidity
proxies are % deviations from their 3–year moving averages, respectively. Grey bars indicate NBER
recession dates.
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014−5
0
8
−5
0
8
Annual Real GDP Growth (%) (LHS axis)
House Market Illiquidity (standardised) % deviation from 3–year MA (LHS axis)
Stock Market Illiquidity (standardised) % deviation from 3–year MA (RHS axis)
Figure 2: US Real GDP growth (%), House Market Illiquidity and Stock Market
Illiquidity from 2000 to 2014
Notes: This figure plots the annual % growth rate of US real GDP (LHS axis), House market illiquidity
(expressed as the standardised % from its 3–year moving average) (LHS axis) and Stock market illiquidity
(expressed as the standardised % deviation from its 3–year moving average) (RHS axis) from 2000 to
2014, respectively.
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3 Econometric Methodology
3.1 A Time-varying Parameter VAR with Stochastic Volatility
Following Primiceri (2005) the full TVP VAR with M variables, p lags and t time series obser-
vations takes the form:
yt = Z ′tβt +A−1t Φtεt (3)
βt = βt−1 + υt, υt v N(0, Q) (4)
where Zt = IM ⊗ [1, y′t−1, . . . , y′t−p], ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product and IM is an M dimen-
sional identity matrix. In our benchmark analysis M = 5. We set p = 2 in line with Cogley
and Sargent (2005); Primiceri (2005); Hubrich and Tetlow (2015) and Prieto et al. (2016). The
structural shocks of the model, εt follow εt viid N(0, IM ). The coefficients βt follow driftless
random walks. The matrix At is an M ×M lower triangular matrix with ones along the di-
agonal. Below the diagonal elements are the contemporaneous relations of the variables in the
model. Φt is an M ×M diagonal matrix that contains the reduced form stochastic volatility
innovations. In our case, we define the time-varying matrices At, Φt as:
Φt ≡

φ1,t 0 0 0 0
0 φ2,t 0 0 0
0 0 φ3,t 0 0
0 0 0 φ4,t 0
0 0 0 0 φ5,t
 At ≡

1 0 0 0 0
α21,t 1 0 0 0
α31,t α32,t 1 0 0
α41,t α42,t α43,t 1 0
α51,t α52,t α53,t α54,t 1
 (5)
the contemporaneous relations αij,t and the volatility innovations φi,t drift throughout time.
Constructing αt as the row-wise stacking of elements below the diagonal
αt = [α21,t, α31,t, α32,t, . . . , α54,t]′
and collecting the diagonal elements in the vector
φt = [φ1,t, φ2,t, φ3,t, φ4,t, φ5,t]′
we assume:
αt = αt−1 + ζt, ζt v N(0, S) (6)
lnφt = lnφt−1 + ηt, ηt v N(0,W ) (7)
The entire system contains four sources of uncertainty that are jointly Normal:
εt
υt
ζt
ηt
 v N(0, V ), V =

I5 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 W
 (8)
where I5 is a 5 × 5 identity matrix; Q, S, W are all positive definite matrices. S is block
diagonal where the blocks correspond to the parameters belonging in each respective equation.
This increases the efficiency of the estimation algorithm in Appendix B.
3.1.1 Priors
Our prior specification follows closely the specifications in Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Prim-
iceri (2005). We use the first 41 observations (from 1970Q4-1980Q4) to calibrate the initial
7
  
conditions for the parameters of the model7. The initial conditions for the coefficient matrix, β0
are the OLS point estimates from a standard VAR. We set V ar(β0) as four times the variance
of the standard OLS estimates from the training sample. We obtain the prior to initialise A0 in
the same manner. We set lnφ0,i to have a mean equal to the (logarithmic) standard errors of
the OLS estimates (in each equation) to initialise β0; its covariance matrix is an M -dimensional
diagonal matrix where the elements along the main diagonal are equal to 10. Further, setting
the degrees of freedom and scale for the inverse-Wishart prior distributions of the hyperparam-
eters; for each of the five blocks of S, the degrees of freedom are 1 + dim(Si). The degrees of
freedom for Q are set to 1+K (i.e. 1 plus the dimension of βt), where K = 55. W follows an
inverse-Gamma distribution with a single degree of freedom with a scale parameter kW = .01.
The scale matrices are chosen to be constant fractions of the OLS estimates from the training
sample. To summarise:
β0 v N(βˆOLS , 4 · V (βˆOLS))
A0 v N(AˆOLS , 4 · V (AˆOLS))
lnφ0,i v N(ln φˆOLS,i, 10)
Q v IW (k2Q · (1 +K) · V ar(β0), (1 +K))
Wi,i v IG
(
k2W
2 ,
1
2
)
, i = 1 . . .M
Si v IW (k2S · (i+ 1) · V ar(Aˆi,OLS), (i+ 1)), i = 1 . . .M − 1
where IW and IG denote the inverse-Wishart and inverse-Gamma distributions respectively.
Si, i = 1, . . . , 5 denote the blocks of S. Aˆi,OLS denotes the blocks of the OLS estimates of the
blocks of the estimate of Aˆ matrix within the training sample. In line with Primiceri (2005)
and Cogley and Sargent (2005), we set kQ = .01 and kS = .1. We allow for 70,000 iterations of
the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm discarding the first 60,000 as burn in; of
the remaining 10,000 iterations, we sample every 10th draw to reduce autocorrelation amongst
the draws8. Appendix B assesses the convergence properties of the MCMC algorithm.
3.2 Identification of Structural Shocks
We add our illiquidity proxies to the macroeconomic data and order our VAR model as follows:
the inflation rate, pit; output growth, yt; the interest rate it; house market illiquidity H illiqt
and stock market illiquidity Silliqt respectively9. We assume a block recursive composition
of the covariance matrix of structural shocks which is standard in the literature (see among
others: Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005), Hubrich and Tetlow (2015) and Prieto
et al. (2016)). In our case, we define a liquidity shock as a sudden decline to market liquidity
(i.e. an increase in illiquidity). Under this identification scheme, macroeconomic variables are
slow to react to liquidity shocks. Our ordering scheme imposes monetary policy reacts slowly to
liquidity shocks; typically monetary policy decisions are made every six weeks (Swiston, 2008)10.
Additionally, ordering our illiquidity variables last in our VAR model is indicative of reality. For
example, we observe liquidity shocks in late 2008 and policymakers respond by lowering interest
rates in early 2009. Furthermore our liquidity proxies reach their respective peaks at the end of
7Our results remain similar when we allow for 50 and 60 observations to calibrate the initial conditions of the
model.
8Our results are robust when setting the scale matrices to different values; larger values of the scale matrices
induce a higher degree of time-variation into the model.
9Ordering yt before pit yields no differences in the results or conclusions we report in the paper.
10The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) holds eight meetings throughout the year at regular intervals.
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2008, US GDP growth troughs in early 2009. Therefore we postulate our identification scheme
is valid and proceed on this premise; Appendix C reports additional results under an alternative
ordering scheme11.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Stochastic Volatility and Changing Dynamics
In what follows, we analyse whether we can characterise time-variation to the size of liquidity
shocks or to changing dynamics of the transmission mechanism. Changing shock sizes are
captured by the stochastic volatility innovations. The transmission mechanism of these shocks
are encapsulated in the impulse response analysis. In Figure 3, we present the posterior median
along with the one standard deviation percentiles of the stochastic volatility of liquidity shocks
(i.e. the quantiles of the distribution over the draws of φ4,t, φ5,t respectively). It is clear there is
remarkable time-variation in the standard deviation of structural liquidity shocks. Notice that
the volatility of house market liquidity shocks in the 2008 recession remains persistently high
for at least four years after the recession ends. This resilience may suggest a magnifying and
longer lasting impact of house market liquidity shocks following the Great Recession. Figure 3
corroborates with Claessens et al. (2012) in that recessions preceding a property market bust
are more extensive, in depth and time, than those without. For example the 2001 recession
yields little change in the volatility of house market liquidity shocks. Contrastingly in the same
periods, the volatility of shocks to stock market liquidity surge temporarily and then revert
back to levels consistent with non–recessionary periods12.
In Figure 4 we plot the posterior median impulse response functions of GDP growth to
liquidity shocks at a five year horizon for each observation in our sample (i.e. 1981Q3-2014Q4).
Given an increase in our proxies constitutes a decline in liquidity, a liquidity shock therefore
implies a sudden decline in market liquidity. Clearly, shocks to stock market liquidity yield
temporarily contractionary effects to GDP growth. Across time the magnitude of stock market
liquidity shocks are decreasing, yet the persistence remains similar. This result is consistent
with Prieto et al. (2016), who show that stock price shocks also exhibit a decreasing impact on
US GDP growth. In fact, they find that the overall contribution of the stock market to the Great
Recession plays a negligible role13. Nevertheless, the impact of stock market liquidity shocks to
GDP growth are significant–relative to 68% posterior credible intervals–across all time periods.
Although the impact on GDP lessens throughout time, there are still economically meaningful
contractionary effects.
On the other hand, the real effects of house market liquidity shocks are trivial from 1981 to
2005 with the posterior median response of GDP barely fluctuating away from 0. We postulate
the inconsequential impact of liquidity shocks on GDP from 1981 to 2000 links with the in-
creasing securitisation of mortgages. However, GDP growth becomes gradually more sensitive
to house market liquidity shocks from around 2005 onwards; the impulse response functions’ pos-
terior credible intervals indicate significance from 2005Q2 (further results available on request).
The transition in impact of house market liquidity shocks aligns closely with disturbances in
the housing market. Interestingly, the economic significance of house market liquidity shocks
is greatest when GDP is at its (sample) minimum value (i.e. -4.15% in 2009Q2). When GDP
growth is at its sample maximum in 1984Q1 notice, from Figure 4, that a liquidity shock spurs
11Results are consistent if we place GDP growth before inflation. Ordering GDP and inflation in this manner
is consistent with Hubrich and Tetlow (2015) and Prieto et al. (2016).
12We report the stochastic volatility of macroeconomic shocks in Appendix C; along with plots of the time-
varying parameters and time-varying covariances.
13Our results are qualitatively similar when we also include credit spreads in our model, the credit spread is
the difference between Moody’s BAA-AAA corporate bond spread. Appendix C reports the results including
credit spreads.
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Figure 3: Stochastic Volatility of Liquidity Shocks from 1981 to 2014
Notes: This figure shows the median and 1 standard deviation percentiles of the time-varying standard
deviations of structural liquidity shocks for Stock Market illiquidity, Silliqt and House Market illiquidity,
Hilliqt from 1981-2014, respectively. Grey bars indicate NBER recession dates.
virtually no response in GDP growth in this period. The difference in the transmission of house
market liquidity shocks across our sample indicates there is a structural change in the dynamics
between GDP growth and house market liquidity.
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Figure 4: Impact of Liquidity Shocks on GDP growth 1981 to 2014
Notes: This figure plots the median impulse response functions of US real GDP growth with respect
to: a unit stock and house market liquidity shock respectively. We plot the response along a 5-year
horizon for each quarter of our sample 1981Q3-2014Q4. A liquidity shock constitutes a decline in market
liquidity (i.e. an increase in illiquidity).
Following the practice of Gal´ı and Gambetti (2009) and Prieto et al. (2016), we plot in
Figure 5, the differences in average impulse response of GDP growth to liquidity shocks between
different periods stemming from NBER recession dates. This allows us to distinguish if there
are differences in the economic impact of liquidity shocks across the business cycle. We compute
for each draw of the Gibbs sampler, the average impulse response over each of the periods, take
the difference between the averages and then calculate the quantiles over the draws. In the left
panel, we compare all recessions excluding the Great Recession with non–recessionary periods.
The middle and right panel compare the Great Recession with non–recessionary periods and all
other recessions in our sample; this is to evaluate possible heterogeneities in the transmission
of liquidity shocks. Our results suggest little difference in the average impact of stock market
liquidity shocks across periods.
On the other hand, we see asymmetries in the response of GDP to house market liquidity
shocks. Our model implies an increasing exposure of GDP to house market liquidity shocks
11
  
in the post financial crisis period; which links closely with the persistence of the volatility of
structural shocks in Figure 3. Clearly, our results show that the impact of house market liquidity
shocks on GDP growth are stronger during the Great Recession than non–recessionary periods.
Perhaps even more interestingly, Figure 5 shows the effects of house market liquidity shocks
onto GDP growth during the Great Recession are more damaging in terms of magnitude and
tenacity relative to normal times and other recessions within our sample14.
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses of GDP growth: Differences in averages over periods
Notes: Panels one to three show the averages of differences in impulse responses of GDP growth to
liquidity shocks between: other recessionary (i.e. NBER recession dates excluding the Great Reces-
sion) and non–recessionary periods (left panel: Other Recess-No Recess); The Great Recession and
non–recessionary periods (middle panel: 08 Recess-No Recess) and The Great Recession and other re-
cessionary periods (right panel: 08 Recess-Other Recess) respectively. Recessionary periods are NBER
recession dates. We compute the difference in average impulse response as follows: for each draw of the
Gibbs sampler, we average the impulse response over each of the selected periods, take the difference
between the averages of selected periods and then calculate the quantiles over the draws. A liquidity
shock constitutes a decline in market liquidity (i.e. an increase in illiquidity).
In Figure 6, we report the median and one standard deviation percentiles of the contribu-
tions of stock and house market liquidity structural shocks to the overall variance of real GDP
growth across our sample. Following Benati and Mumtaz (2007), we compute the variance
decomposition in the frequency domain by computing, for each quarter, at each iteration of the
Gibbs sampler, real GDP’s actual spectral density and five counterfactual spectral densities by
setting to zero the variances of each of the structural shocks but one15. The following discussion
and analysis refers to the posterior median estimates of the structural variance decompositions.
14This finding could be partly attributable to our methodology and the length of the most recent recession.
Our model allows for smoothly changing parameters throughout time which may, in fact, only capture parameter
change over long periods. However, our model implies liquidity shocks in the property sector yield contractionary
real effects even after the financial crisis.
15Since a series variance is equal to the integral of its spectral density, we can compute a structural decompo-
sition of GDP growth’s variance at each point in time; noting that the sum of the five counterfactual spectral
densities is by construction equal to the overall variance of the series in question. It is not possible to uniquely
identify the innovation variances of the structural shocks, but it is possible to compute the time-varying covariance
matrix of the VAR that results by setting innovation variances to zero.
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The contribution of stock market liquidity shocks to the variance of GDP varies considerably
over our sample. We can see that during the stock market crash of 1987 and the 1991 reces-
sion, the structural stock market liquidity shocks account for 20% of the variation in real GDP
growth. In 2008 the stock market explains 36% of the variance of real GDP growth; however,
this is a temporary shift and by 2010, the fraction of GDP’s variance attributable to stock
market liquidity shocks is about 5%.
The contribution of house market liquidity shocks to the overall variance of GDP also varies
remarkably over our sample. In the 1980s, the fraction of GDP’s variance we associate to
house market liquidity shocks fluctuates around 10%. Then, following the recession in 1991,
the fraction jumps to around 35% and fluctuates around 30% until 1997. In the early 2000s
and during the dot com bubble burst, house market liquidity shocks revert back to around 10%
of the overall variance of GDP. However as the problems within the property sector start to
emerge from 2005, house market liquidity shocks start to have an increasing effect. From 2008
until the end of 2014, house market liquidity shocks explain on average, 46% of the variation in
GDP growth.
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Figure 6: Contribution of Structural Liquidity Shocks to the Overall Variance of
Real GDP Growth from 1981 to 2014
Notes: This figure plots the median and one standard deviation percentiles of the contribution of struc-
tural stock and house market liquidity shocks to real GDP growth from 1981 to 2014. Grey bars indicate
NBER recession dates.
The shape of these figures are strikingly similar to the volatility of structural shocks in Figure
3. This implies the majority of the time-variation in the structural variance decomposition is
due to changing shock sizes. Taking the results together, the key driving forces to during the
Great Recession are structural liquidity shocks. The average contribution of stock and house
market liquidity shocks to the variation in GDP growth during the most recent recession are
17% and 35% respectively. The average total contribution of liquidity shocks to the variation
in GDP growth is therefore 52%16. At the end of our sample (i.e. 2014Q4) the contribution
of stock and house market liquidity shocks to GDP growth variance are around 3% and 37%
respectively. From 2009 until 2014, the average contribution of house market liquidity shocks
16This is consistent with Figure 2 in Prieto et al. (2016) who find that the total contribution of financial shocks
from a forecast error variance decomposition is around 50%.
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to the variation in real GDP growth is 46%. This, together with Figure 6, suggests the low
rates of GDP growth after the Great Recession are predominantly due to a fragile and sluggish
recovery of the US property market17.
In general, the resilience of GDP to stock market liquidity shocks may reflect a dimin-
ishing demand for precautionary savings stemming from less uncertainty (see Arestis et al.
(2001)). Further, as financial integration increases, domestic real effects may be offset by inter-
national investor participation as risks (and subsequently economic impacts) transmit to other
economies18. The increasing real effects of house market liquidity shocks may arise due to surges
in subprime mortgage lending causing increases in debt levels (Mian and Sufi, 2009; Mian et al.,
2015). Similarly, increases in the net worth of financial intermediaries due to surges in house
prices in the early 2000s facilitates a relax in lending constraints; consequently injecting too
much liquidity into the property sector. Coupling with the former, the proliferating sensitivity
of GDP to house market liquidity shocks are in line with explanations in Iacoviello and Neri
(2010); who maintain housing preference shocks have larger effects on GDP when collateral
effects are taken into account.
Overall our results provide substantial evidence that the US property sector has asymmet-
rical real effects not only across the business cycle, but amongst troughs in business cycles
across our sample (see bottom right panel of Figure 5). Furthermore, we show that liquidity
conditions in the stock and housing markets contribute heavily to the overall variation in real
GDP growth; particularly during crisis periods. Our results with regards to the stock market
contrast Prieto et al. (2016) who find that the stock market has negligible explanatory power for
US GDP variation during the financial crisis. By isolating the liquidity component from stock
prices, we find that stock market liquidity is an important factor in explaining US GDP vari-
ance during the Great Recession. The immediate policy implication is that liquidity provision
to financial and asset markets is necessary to counteract damaging contractions to GDP growth.
Studying the economic impact of liquidity shocks throughout time signals liquidity provision,
particularly during the most recent recession, is essential to promote recovery. Our findings
justify US policy responses to the turmoil of 2008 such as: injecting liquidity into financial asset
markets through Quantitative Easing (QE) policies; providing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
with capital injections in September 2008; both the Home Affordable Modification and Home
Affordable Refinancing Progams (HAMP, HARP) and incentives to reduce principal loans to
borrowers whose mortgages exceed their property value.
5 Robustness Analysis
5.1 The Real Effects of Volatility Shocks
There is an implicit relationship between asset market liquidity and asset price volatility. For
example, Florackis et al. (2014) note a negative correlation between stock market liquidity and
volatility; particularly in a bear market. Also, Levine and Zervos (1998) stress that liquidity
and volatility may possess an important relationship and provide an empirical investigation
on the real effects of stock market liquidity and volatility. Furthermore, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Levine (1996) state that as a result of greater stock market liquidity, less uncertainty associated
with investment could reduce saving rates. While less uncertainty proves attractive for risk
averse investors, it also diminishes the precautionary motive to save which may deter long term
economic growth. However, a more intuitive channel is provided in Arestis et al. (2001). The
former note that increases in price uncertainty, possibly as a result of declining liquidity, can
hinder an efficient allocation of investment which feeds through into real activity.
17The structural variance decomposition of GDP growth from our TVP VAR including corporate bond spreads
in Appendix C uncovers that this is not due to liquidity shocks being correlated with credit risk shocks.
18An important future avenue would be to quantify real international spillover effects of stock market liquidity
shocks.
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Campbell and Cocco (2007) link price fluctuations in the housing market to the real economy
via the consumption channel. The volatility of house prices corresponds to changes in housing
wealth which exhibit a positive correlation with consumption. On the other hand, housing
are pledgeable as collateral to obtain credit. Surging prices relax borrowing constraints and
allow agents to smooth consumption over the life cycle (Ortalo-Magne and Rady, 2006). Stein
(1995) associates uncertainty and liquidity in the property sector under the assumption that
a down payment must be made. The multiple equilibria the model implies helps explain large
fluctuations in house prices19. Diaz and Jerez (2013) establish an intuitive link between liquidity
and uncertainty. Their theoretical model is able to reproduce the cyclical time series properties
of the US property sector. As liquidity decreases in the property sector before and during the
Great Recession, prices fluctuate and volatility intensifies.
Notably, as market liquidity and volatility may possess an important connection, it is neces-
sary to investigate the economic impact of volatility shocks. If we cannot properly distinguish
between the real effects of these shocks, adequate policy recommendations cannot be made.
To proxy market uncertainty we estimate an ARCH(1) and GARCH(1,1) model of the abso-
lute value of quarterly stock and house price changes from 1968 to 2014 respectively. Using
the absolute value of price changes is shown to predict volatility with greater precision than
squared returns (Forsberg and Ghysels, 2007)20. We use stock data on the NYSE composite
price index (available from Thomson Reuters DataStream); house price data is from Robert J.
Shiller’s website. We convert stock and house prices into real variables by dividing by the GDP
deflator; returns are logarithmic differences. We include lags of the dependent variables in the
mean equations of our ARCH and GARCH models to whiten the residuals deleting those that
are not statistically significant21.
Table 2 reports our ARCH(1) and GARCH(1,1) specifications for stock and house price
inflation from 1968 to 2014. In addition to parameter estimates, we report the autocorrelations
of the residuals up to 8 lags. Note also that we restrict the variance equation for house price
inflation to ρ + θ = 1; otherwise the conditional variance is explosive. To keep our analysis
consistent, our volatility measures are the % deviations from their 3-year moving averages of
the conditional volatility from our ARCH(1) and GARCH(1,1) models22. We add our volatility
measures, Hσt , Sσt to our macroeconomic data and liquidity proxies ordered in the following
manner: inflation, pit; real GDP growth, yt; the interest rate, it; house market liquidity, H illiqt ;
house price volatility, Hσt ; stock market liquidity, S
illiq
t and stock price volatility Sσt . Therefore
we estimate a 7 variable TVP VAR as in (3)-(8) in the exact manner as before23.
Figure 7 plots the time-varying impact of liquidity and volatility shocks from the US stock
and housing market onto real GDP growth. Our results reveal that GDP growth responds
19However, the implications for uncertainty are sensitive to parameter values and the initial level of liquidity
within the market.
20Using absolute returns is also thought to be robust to outliers than volatility measures using squared returns
(Florackis et al., 2014). We also estimate specifications using squared real returns; analysis results in the same
conclusions to those we report herein.
21Initially, we estimate GARCH(1,1) specifications of the absolute value of real quarterly stock and house price
changes with lags of the dependent variables up to and including 5 lags.
22A widely accepted measure of stock market volatility is the VIX index (see among others Connolly et al.
(2005)). The VIX index uses option implied volatility of 30-day puts and calls for at the money options for stocks
listed on the S&P500 index. However, VIX data starts only in 1990 which is too short to use in our analysis. The
contemporaneous correlation (for the sample 1990 to 2014) between the conditional volatility from our ARCH
specification of absolute real stock returns and the VIX index is 0.55 respectively. We also consider the annual
change in conditional volatilities implied from our models in Table 2. Results are the qualitatively similar to
those we report within.
23Ordering our volatility measures in this manner implicitly assumes that volatility shocks contemporaneously
affect liquidity conditions. We postulate this as a valid assumption following the causal chain outlined in Diaz
and Jerez (2013). The former note that liquidity shocks can propagate onto current and future price variability.
Our results are robust to alternative orderings and the impulse response analysis results in qualitatively similar
conclusions; results available on request.
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Table 2: ARCH/GARCH Models of Real Stock and House Price Inflation from
1968 to 2014
|∆st| = µ+ β1|∆st−1|+ β2|∆st−3|+ νt, σ2νt = ω + ρν2t−1
|∆ht| = µ+ β1|∆ht−1|+ β2|∆ht−2|+ β3|∆ht−4|+ β4|∆ht−5|+ υt, σ2υt = ρυ2t−1 + θσ2υt−1
Panel/Eq: A: |∆st| B: |∆ht|
Sample: 1968Q1-2014Q4
Mean Eq:
µ 2.998(0.69) µ 0.345(0.09)
β1 0.152(0.07) β1 0.542(0.07)
β2 0.203(0.08) β2 -0.096(0.06)
β3 0.60(0.06)
β4 -0.38(0.06)
Variance Eq:
ω 12.023(2.63) ρ 0.102(0.06)
ρ 0.618(0.33) θ 0.898(0.06)
Autocorrelations
lag AC lag AC
1 -0.033 1 0.003
2 0.093 2 -0.038
3 0.021 3 0.091
4 -0.081 4 0.046
5 -0.017 5 0.056
6 -0.086 6 -0.086
7 0.047 7 0.018
8 -0.083 8 0.014
Notes: Panel A of this table presents an ARCH(1) model of the abso-
lute value of real stock price inflation using quarterly NYSE compos-
ite index returns from 1968 to 2014. Panel B of this table presents a
GARCH(1,1) model of the absolute value of quarterly house price in-
flation using Case & Shiller composite price index from 1968 to 2014
respectively. Standard errors are in parantheses. We restrict the
variance equation for house price inflation such that ρ + θ = 1. The
bottom panel reports the autocorrelation functions of the residuals
up to lag length 8.
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counter intuitively to stock market volatility shocks. Note however that posterior credible in-
tervals contain 0 at every observation. Turning our attention to the real effects of volatility
shocks from the housing market, the response of real GDP growth remains relatively constant
throughout our sample. However, the impact of house price volatility shocks on GDP growth
increases in the early 2000s. Furthermore, posterior credible intervals indicate significant con-
tractions in GDP growth at every observation of our sample. In comparing the ramifications
of liquidity and volatility shocks from both the stock and house market, it is clear there are
obvious differences in the response of real GDP growth throughout time. In particular, note
that the real effects of liquidity shocks are not due to price volatility within the stock and
housing market. Therefore, our results imply that volatility shocks and liquidity shocks from
these markets are fundamentally different.
To understand the potential asymmetries of the real effects of these shocks from our 7
variable TVP VAR, we plot in Figure 8 the differences in average impulse responses over different
time periods. Our results reveal no asymmetries between the impact of volatility shocks in the
Great Recession and other recessions in our sample. Moreover, there is no significant difference
in average impulse responses between the Great Recession and non–recessionary periods. This
implies there are no discernible differences (on average) between volatility shocks both across
the business cycle, and over business cycle troughs in our sample. However, we can see that the
impact of house market liquidity shocks on GDP growth during the 2008 recession is stronger
and more persistent than in normal periods, and other recessions.
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Figure 7: Impact of Volatility and Liquidity Shocks on GDP growth from 1981 to
2014
Notes: This figure plots the median impulse response functions of US real GDP growth with respect to
stock and house market liquidity shocks, Silliqt , H
illiq
t and stock and house market volatility shocks, Sσt ,
Hσt respectively. We plot the response along a 5-year horizon for each quarter of our sample 1981Q3-
2014Q4. A liquidity shock constitutes a decline in market liquidity (i.e. an increase in illiquidity) and a
volatility shock constitutes an increase in price volatility.
In general these findings reveal that there are stark differences between the real effects
of price volatility shocks relative to liquidity shocks. The results from our 7 variable TVP
VAR further support the analysis from our 5 variable TVP VAR. We can see there are no
substantial differences in the transmission of price volatility shocks over the business cycle. In
particular, the response of GDP growth to stock market volatility shocks echoes Levine and
17
  
5 10 15 20
−0.04
0
0.04
Sh
oc
k
to
S
σ t
Other Recess-No Recess
5 10 15 20−0.1
0
0.1
08 Recess-No Recess
5 10 15 20−0.2
0
0.2
08 Recess-Other Recess
5 10 15 20−0.05
0
0.05
Sh
oc
k
to
S
il
li
q
t
5 10 15 20−0.2
0
0.2
5 10 15 20−0.2
0
0.2
5 10 15 20−0.1
0
0.1
Sh
oc
k
to
H
σ t
5 10 15 20−0.2
0
0.2
5 10 15 20−0.3
0
0.3
5 10 15 20−0.1
0
0.1
Sh
oc
k
to
H
il
li
q
t
5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
5 10 15 20−0.3
0
Figure 8: Impulse Responses of GDP growth: Differences in averages over periods
Notes: Panels one to three show the averages of differences in impulse responses of GDP growth to
liquidity shocks between: other recessionary (i.e. NBER recession dates excluding the Great Reces-
sion) and non–recessionary periods (left panel: Other Recess-No Recess); The Great Recession and
non–recessionary periods (middle panel: 08 Recess-No Recess) and The Great Recession and other re-
cessionary periods (right panel: 08 Recess-Other Recess) respectively. Recessionary periods are NBER
recession dates. We compute the difference in average impulse response as follows: for each draw of the
Gibbs sampler, we average the impulse response over each of the selected periods, take the difference
between the averages of selected periods and then calculate the quantiles over the draws. A liquidity
shock constitutes a decline in market liquidity (i.e. an increase in illiquidity) and a volatility shock
constitutes an increase in price volatility.
Zervos (1998) who show a fragile link between stock market volatility, relative to stock market
liquidity, and economic growth. Our findings demonstrate little variation in the contraction
of real GDP growth over time with respect to house price volatility shocks. However, the
sensitivity of GDP growth increases slightly in the early 2000s. This links well with surging
house prices in the very same period as a result of relaxes in lending constraints. Nonetheless
it is difficult to ascertain asymmetries in the response of GDP growth to price volatility shocks
across the business cycle and different recessions for our sample. Therefore, our analysis reveals
the real effects of volatility and liquidity shocks from stock and house markets are fundamentally
different.
5.2 Increasing the Information Set: TVP VAR models with Liquidity Prox-
ies and Financial Factors
The results in previous sections of this paper rely on a relatively small information set. Therefore
identification of structural shocks, and their impact on real GDP growth may be misleading;
especially with respect to our structural variance decomposition. Hubrich and Tetlow (2015)
use the Financial Stress Index (FSI) constructed by the Federal Reserve Board. This index
relies on data from 9 variables that account for credit conditions (in the form of interest rate
spreads) and the stock market24. The FSI is computed as a weighted average of the demeaned
data where the weights are a function of the inverse sample standard deviations. However due
to data availability, the index may only be computed from 1988; which is too short for our
study.
Therefore, to extend our information set, we rely on a quarterly version of the database
24See Table 2 in Hubrich and Tetlow (2015).
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in McCracken and Ng (2016). We compute financial factors using a subset of the FRED-
QD database using principal component analysis. Our dataset contains 74 series that contain
information on housing, interest rates, money and credit, household balance sheets, exchange
rates and the stock market25. Following the test in Bai and Ng (2002), the number of factors
present our dataset is 3. We retain only those factors whose eigenvalues are greater than 1, thus
leaving us with the first two. We denote our financial factors F 1t and F 2t respectively26. These
factors explain 80.23% of the total variance in our dataset. Specifically, F 1t and F 2t explain
46.3% and 33.93% of the overall variation respectively.
In Table 3, we report the average contribution of liquidity and financial factor shocks from
our baseline 5 variable TVP VAR model (Model 1) and 3 alternative models (Models 2 to 4) to
US real GDP growth volatility during the Great Recession. In Models 2 to 4, we increase the
information set and estimate TVP VAR models using inflation, real GDP growth and the Federal
Funds rate with combinations of our liquidity proxies (H illiqt , S
illiq
t and financial factors, F 1t ,
F 2t . As we can see from Models 2 to 4, the contribution of liquidity shocks to real GDP growth
volatility remains robust to including F 1t (Model 2), F 2t (Model 3) and both financial factors
(Model 4). We can see that the contribution of structural liquidity shocks to real GDP growth
volatility from our baseline model (Model 1) are robust to including additional financial data.
There are two noteworthy points in Table 3. The first is that the average contribution of house
market liquidity shocks to GDP growth variation in Model 2 falls, relative to Model 1 (i.e. our
baseline model), by 5 percentage points; from 35% to 30%. Secondly, the average contribution
of stock market liquidity shocks to GDP volatility in Model 4 increases by 6 percentage points
(relative to Model 1); from 17% to 23%.
To obtain a better idea of how robust our baseline structural variance decomposition through-
out our estimation sample, we plot in Figure 9, the posterior median of the time-varying contri-
butions of stock and house market liquidity shocks to real GDP growth volatility from Models
1 to 4. Clearly, the contribution of stock and house market liquidity shocks to GDP growth
variation from Models 2 to 4 remain remarkably similar to our baseline specification. The re-
sults from our alternative specifications imply that the impact and magnitude of our structural
liquidity shocks on real GDP growth volatility are robust; even when accounting for the financial
sector using a large dataset.
Overall, these results reveal that allowing for the financial sector on a broader scale has a
negligible effect on the real effects of stock and house market liquidity shocks. Table 3 implies
that even when accounting for the broader financial sector, liquidity shocks from stock and
housing markets contribute around 50% toward the overall variation in GDP growth during
the most recent recession. The plots in Figure 9 demonstrate the robustness of our structural
variance decomposition over our full estimation sample. Both Table 3 and Figure 9 provide
further support that liquidity shocks resonating from stock and housing markets were the main
drivers of the most recent recession. The above not only demonstrates the importance of
allowing time-variation in the structural links between asset markets and the real economy,
but also supports our conjecture in allowing for contemporaneous relationships between asset
markets themselves.
25Our dataset consists of 74 series because this is the number of financial variables for which we have a balanced
panel. The FRED-QD database contains 257 series on macroeconomic and financial variables from 1959 until
2015. Available from https://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/mccracken/fred-databases/. We also carry
out factor analysis using the data on macroeconomic and financial variables in the FRED-QD database. As for
the FRED-MD database in McCracken and Ng (2016), our test reveals there are 8 factors in the FRED-QD
database. The leading principal component is a macroeconomic factor that is heavily correlated with US real
GDP growth at 0.73. Therefore, we omit the macroeconomic variables from our analysis because of the strong
correlations with both real GDP growth and inflation. Additionally, the existing macroeconomic data included
in our TVP VAR model provides a feasible indication of an economy’s state that is relevant for policymakers.
26Our subset of the FRED-QD database implicitly accounts for our credit risk proxy (see Appendix C) since
it contains Moody’s BAA and AAA corporate bond yields. Factors are remarkably similar when replacing the
former with the difference between BAA and AAA corporate bond yields.
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Table 3: Average Contribution of Structural Liquidity and Financial Factor Shocks
to US real GDP growth Volatility during the Great Recession
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
H illiqt 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.35
Silliqt 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.23
F 1t – 0.09 – 0.08
F 2t – – 0.11 0.04
Total Average Contributions
H illiqt + S
illiq
t 0.52 0.48 0.50 0.58
Notes: This table reports the average contribution of structural liquidity and financial
factor shocks over the Great Recession. Model 1 is our baseline 5 variable TVP VAR
model including inflation, pit; real GDP growth, yt; the Federal Funds rate, it; House
market illiquidity, Hilliqt and Stock market illiquidity, S
illiq
t . Models 2 is a 6 variable
TVP VAR including inflation, pit; real GDP growth, yt; the Federal Funds rate, it; House
market illiquidity, Hilliqt , Stock market illiquidity, S
illiq
t and our first financial factor,
F 1t . Model 3 is a 6 variable TVP VAR including inflation, pit; real GDP growth, yt; the
Federal Funds rate, it; House market illiquidity, Hilliqt , Stock market illiquidity, S
illiq
t
and our second financial factor, F 2t , and Model 4 is a 7 variable TVP VAR including
inflation, pit; real GDP growth, yt; the Federal Funds rate, it; House market illiquidity,
Hilliqt , Stock market illiquidity, S
illiq
t and both financial factors, F 1t , F 2t .
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Figure 9: Contribution of Structural Liquidity Shocks to the Overall Variance of
Real GDP Growth from 1981 to 2014; Baseline and Alternative Specifications
Notes: This figure plots the posterior median time-varying contributions of structural liquidity shocks
to US real GDP growth volatility from 1981Q3–2014Q4 from our baseline TVP VAR model (Model 1)
and 3 alternative models that include financial factors (Models 2–4). Model 1 includes only our liquidity
proxies. Model 2 includes our liquidity proxies and F 1t . Model 3 includes our liquidity proxies and F 2t .
Model 4 includes our liquidity proxies and both financial factors, F 1t , F 2t . Grey bars indicate NBER
recession dates.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we provide insights into the links between asset market liquidity and the real
economy using US data by fitting a Bayesian VAR model with time-varying parameters from
1970 to 2014. A summary of our results is as follows: first, we uncover an economically mean-
ingful contractionary impact of stock market liquidity shocks throughout time; however the
magnitude is decreasing. Second, our analysis demonstrates a stark change in the structural re-
lationship between real GDP growth and house market liquidity from 2005 as disruptions in the
property sector start to emerge. Third, we provide notable evidence of an asymmetric response
of GDP growth to house market liquidity across the business cycle and across business cycle
troughs. Fourth, counterfactual analysis reveals that structural liquidity shocks contribute the
lion’s share of variation in GDP growth–particularly during crisis periods. In the most recent
recession, the average total contribution of stock and house market liquidity shocks explain
17% and 35% of the variation in real GDP growth respectively. Finally, house market liquid-
ity shocks contributes, on average, 46% of the overall variance in real GDP growth from 2009
onwards. This implies that the fragile recovery in the US is partially due to imbalances within
the property sector. Taken together, our analysis sheds light on the need for liquidity provision
into asset markets; particularly during recessions preceding a property bust (Claessens et al.,
2012). Consequently our study justifies attempts to inject liquidity into the property sector and
stock market in response to the Great Recession.
We extend on the main results by showing that the economic impact of stock and house
market liquidity shocks are robust to including stock and house price volatility proxies. For
policymakers, these results imply that house price volatility damages prospects for economic
growth which suggests a need to monitor house price fluctuations. Also, our results suggest
no evidence in favour of an asymmetric response of GDP growth to volatility shocks. However
noting liquidity conditions can propagate house price variability through a variety of factors
such as trading delays (Diaz and Jerez, 2013) and relaxes in borrowing constraints (Mian and
Sufi, 2009), indicates liquidity provision may feed through into hindering the impact of house
price volatility shocks. Further, the time-varying contribution of liquidity shocks to GDP growth
variation are robust when accounting for the financial sector on a broad scale. Specifically, these
results reveal that liquidity shocks were the main driver of GDP growth during the most recent
recession. This provides further substance in favour of our conjecture to account for market
specific liquidity shocks in empirical analysis.
Our work provides considerable scope for future research. First, our results show house mar-
ket liquidity shocks explain the majority of GDP growth variation in the post financial crisis
period. This points toward using our house market liquidity proxy for predicting future reces-
sions over and above existing leading economic indicators. Improving forecasts of fundamental
macroeconomic indicators would be of great interest to central banks. Second, delving deeper
into the origins of macroeconomic-financial structural dynamics, possibly linking parameter
evolution to regulatory reform, would be of paramount importance to examine the effectiveness
of policy implementation. Finally, accounting for stock and house market liquidity in a DSGE
model provides thought provoking avenues in deducing optimal policy responses to asset market
liquidity shocks in a time-varying framework.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Raw Illiquidity Estimates
Table A.1 reports descriptive statistics on the raw estimates of our liquidity proxies. In Panel A
we report the full sample mean and median along with sub-period means for both RtoV st , RtoV ht
respectively. Panel B reports the contemporaneous correlations between our liquidity prox-
ies from 1968 to 2014 along with sub-period correlations (where we denote correlation as
ρ(RtoV st , RtoV ht )). The sub sample means imply liquidity in both the stock and property
market are increasing throughout time. The contemporaneous full sample correlation between
our raw liquidity proxies is 0.64. Turning our attention to the sub sample correlations, there
are substantial differences among decades. In particular the correlation between US stock and
house market liquidity from the late 1960s until 1989 is positive; however from 1990 to 1999,
the correlation is -0.10. In the next decade (i.e. between 2000 and 2009), the correlation is
0.3727. Differences in sub sample correlations suggest the market fundamentals are different.
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics for Raw Estimates of Illiquidity Proxies from 1968
to 2014
Panel A: Mean Analysis of Illiquidity Proxies
Full Sample: 1968-2014
Mean Median Skew Kurt
RtoV st 0.19 0.105 3.124 13.433
RtoV ht 0.063 0.019 2.387 5.994
Sub Sample Means: 1968-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-14
RtoV st 0.486 0.181 0.098 0.023 0.006
RtoV ht 0.181 0.047 0.011 0.016 0.011
Panel B: Correlation between Illiquidity Proxies
Full Sample: 1968-2014
ρ(RtoV st , RtoV ht ) 0.641
Sub Sample: 1968-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-14
ρ(RtoV st , RtoV ht ) 0.204 0.132 -0.101 0.373 -0.06
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for the raw estimates of stock and house
market illiquidity proxies, RtoV st , RtoV ht from 1968Q4-2014Q4. We follow Amihud (2002)
in constructing our illiquidity proxies as in equations (1) and (2); RtoV st is scaled by 106
and RtoV ht is scaled by 109 respectively. Panel A reports mean and median estimates.
The top half of Panel A reports full sample estimates of the respective means and medians
along with estimates of skewness and kurtosis. The bottom half of Panel A reports sub
sample mean estimates. Panel B reports the contemporaneous correlations between our
illiquidity proxies, denoted as ρ(RtoV st , RtoV ht ). The first half of Panel B reports the
full sample correlation. The second half of Panel B reports sub sample correlations.
27The correlation between our liquidity proxies from 2000-2007 is 0.58; during 2008 and 2009 the correlation
is 0.68; finally, between the years 2000 and 2014 the correlation is 0.44.
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Appendix B: Estimation Algorithms
Posterior Computation of TVP VAR with Stochastic Volatility
To estimate our TVP VAR with stochastic volatility, we use the algorithm developed in Prim-
iceri (2005); notation is consistent with Section 3. The first step is to draw the time-varying
coefficients. The density of βt, p(βt) can be factored following Carter and Kohn (1994) as:
p(βT |yT , AT ,ΦT , V ) = p(βT |yT , AT ,ΦT , V )
T−1∏
t=1
p(βt|βt+1, yt, AT ,ΦT , V )
where
βt|βt+1, yt, AT ,ΦT , V v N(βt|t+ 1,Ξt|t+1)
βt|t+1 = E(βt|βt+1, yt, AT ,ΦT , V ),
Ξt|t+1 = V ar(βt|βt+1, yt, AT ,ΦT , V ).
E(·) & V ar(·) denote the expectation and variance operator respectively. the βt vector is drawn
using forward and backward Kalman filter recursions. The last recursion of the filter provides
the mean and variance of the posterior distribution of βt.
In order to draw covariance states, S is assumed to be block diagonal and the Kalman filter
is applied backward equation by equation. We recursively recover:
ai,t|t+1 = E(ai,t|ai,t+1, yt, AT ,ΦT , V ),
Υi,t|t+1 = V ar(ai,t|ai,t+1, yt, AT ,ΦT , V ).
here ai,t is the ith block of at which corresponds to the coefficients of the ith equation in:
yˆt = Xtat + Φtεt
because (3) can be written as
At(yt − Z ′tβt) = Atyˆt = Φtεt
ai,t is sampled recursively in the same way as sampling the coefficients βt fromN(ai,t|t+1,Υi,t|t+1).
Drawing volatility states requires sampling from a mixture of 7 Normal distributions (Kim
et al., 1998). We convert yˆt = Φtεt into a system of linear equations by squaring and taking
logarithms of every element which leads to an approximating state space form:
log(yˆ2t + 0.001) = 2φt + t
φt = φt−1 + ηt
where i,t = log(ε2i,t). As noted in Primiceri (2005), the measurement equation innovations are
logχ2(1) distributed. The mixture of 7 Normals is now required to transform this equations into
a linear Gaussian system as in Kim et al. (1998). Now defining νT = [ν1, . . . , νT ]′ as a matrix
of indicator variables that selects which member of the mixture of Normal approximations is
used at every point in time. Conditional on βT , AT , V and νT we are now able to recursively
recover φt|t+1 and Φt|t+1 from a Normal distribution. Note:
φt|t+1 = E(φt|φt+1, yt, AT , βT , V, νT )
Φt|t+1 = V ar(φt|φt+1, yt, AT , βT , V, νT )
Finally, drawing the hyperparameters of the model are from inverse Wishart distributions re-
spectively. In summary, the steps are as follows:
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1. Initialise parameters
2. Sample βT from p(βT |yT , AT , ΦT , V )
3. Sample AT from p(AT |yT , βT , ΦT , V )
4. Sample ΦT from p(ΦT |yT , AT , βT , νT , V )
5. Sample νT from p(νT |yT , AT , ΦT , V )
6. Sample V by sampling Q, W, S
7. Repeat steps 2-6
Assessing the Convergence of the MCMC Algorithm
We compute the inefficiency factors for the draws of states from their respective posterior
distributions. Following Primiceri (2005), we compute the inefficiency factors as the inverse of
the relative numerical efficiency (RNE) measure
RNE = (2pi)−1 1
S(0)
∫ pi
−pi
S(ω)dω
where S(ω) is the spectral density of the sequence of draws from the Gibbs sampler for the
quantity of interest at frequency ω.
Figure B.1 plots the inefficiency factors for the time varying coefficients of the VAR (the
βt), the non zero elements of the matrix At and the volatilities (φi,t’s) respectively–and for the
model’s hyperparameters, i.e. the free elements of the matrices Q, S, and W respectively. The
figure clearly shows that the autocorrelation of the draws is impeccably low, in the vast majority
of cases below 0.8. As stressed in Primiceri (2005) and others, values of the inefficiency factors
below 20 are satisfactory.
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Figure B.1: Convergence of the MCMC algorithm; Inefficiency Factors
Notes: This figure shows the inefficiency factors computed for the draws of the elements of the matrices:
βt, At, Ht, Q, S and W
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Appendix C: Additional Results
This section reports additional results from our benchmark analysis, along with additional ro-
bustness checks. Specifically, we report the stochastic volatility innovations of macroeconomic
shocks, parameter evolution and contemporaneous relations. The stochastic volatility inno-
vations of macroeconomic shocks track the size of shocks throughout our estimation sample.
Parameter evolution and contemporaneous relations reveal the degree of time–variation within
the benchmark model. We include additional robustness checks by presenting the results from
an alternative structural identification and a TVP VAR model including corporate bond spreads.
Stochastic Volatility, Parameter Evolution, and Contemporaneous Relations for our
main TVP VAR model
In Figure C.1 we plot the median and one deviation percentiles of the time-varying volatility
estimates of the structural shocks for our macroeconomic variables. A noteworthy point to
consider is the remarkable similarities between the volatility estimates of structural shocks to
the interest rate our model implies and those in Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) and Prieto
et al. (2016); the former estimates are from a DSGE model.
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Figure C.1: Stochastic Volatility of Macroeconomic Shocks from 1981 to 2014
Notes: This figure shows the median and 1 standard deviation percentiles of the time-varying standard
deviations of structural shocks for the inflation rate, pit, real GDP growth, yt and the interest rate, it
from 1981-2014 respectively. Grey bars indicate NBER recession dates.
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Figures C.2 and C.3 plot the evolution of the autoregressive parameters which we sum over lags
and the contemporaneous relations between the variables. There is time-variation in both the
time-varying coefficient matrices and the contemporaneous relations; as we can see, the degree
of variation is more significant in the contemporaneous relations.
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Figure C.2: Parameter Evolution (elements of βt)
Notes: This figure plots the posterior median (and one standard deviations percentiles) of the autore-
gressive parameters summing over the lags.
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Figure C.3: Contemporaneous Relations (elements of At)
Notes: This figure plots the posterior median (and one standard deviations percentiles) of the contem-
poraneous relations between our macroeconomic and financial variables.
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Baseline TVP VAR using an Alternative Identification
The assumptions underpinning our identification scheme requires discussion. Our baseline iden-
tification scheme places financial variables after the macroeconomic variables. This implies that
our illiquidity proxies react immediately to macroeconomic shocks. Conversely macroeconomic
variables are slow to respond to liquidity shocks. Another plausible assumption is that interest
rates can react contemporaneously to liquidity shocks within the property sector28. Our alter-
native identification scheme places house market liquidity before the interest rate. Therefore
variables enter the VAR in the following order: inflation, pit; GDP growth, yt; house market
liquidity, H illiqt ; the interest rate, it and stock market liquidity, S
illiq
t .
Figure C.4 plots the median impulse response function of GDP to liquidity shocks. Unsur-
prisingly, the posterior median response of real GDP growth to stock market liquidity shocks
remains similar. The impact of house market liquidity shocks under our alternative ordering
remain largely similar to those from our baseline identification scheme. The only difference is
the posterior median response of GDP in late 2009 reaches a trough considerably lower than the
posterior median responses both during the Great Recession and the period following. Apart
from this anomaly, the profile of the posterior median impulse response functions remain similar
to those we report in the main text.
Figure C.5 plots the differences in average impulse responses of GDP to stock and house
market liquidity shocks in different periods under our alternative identification scheme. It is
clear that the same conclusions hold as in our baseline analysis for the impact of stock market
liquidity shocks on GDP growth during different periods. Conversely, ordering house market
liquidity before the interest rate yields different conclusions. In particular, note that our results
here suggest no difference in the average impact of house market liquidity shocks between all
NBER recessions (excluding the Great Recession) and non–recessionary periods. However, this
result is driven by the sensitivity of GDP growth to a house market liquidity shock in late 2009
(see Figure C.4); consequently the response of GDP growth in this time period influences the
average impulse response of GDP in non–recessionary periods. Similarly the results yield no
difference, on average, between the Great Recession and non–recessionary periods. However,
there are differences in the real effects of house market liquidity shocks between the Great
Recession and other recessions within our sample. We find that the severity of liquidity shocks,
in terms of duration and magnitude, is greater (on average) in the most recent recession.
28Bjo¨rnland and Leitemo (2009) place house prices before the interest rate in a standard VAR model.
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Figure C.4: Impact of Liquidity Shocks on GDP growth 1981 to 2014
Notes: This figure plots the median impulse response functions of US real GDP growth with respect
to: a unit stock and house market liquidity shock respectively. We plot the response along a 5-year
horizon for each quarter of our sample 1981Q3-2014Q4. A liquidity shock constitutes a decline in market
liquidity (i.e. an increase in illiquidity).
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Figure C.5: Impulse Responses of GDP growth: Differences in averages over peri-
ods
Notes: Panels one to three show the averages of differences in impulse responses of GDP growth to
liquidity shocks between: other recessionary (i.e. NBER recession dates excluding the Great Reces-
sion) and non–recessionary periods (left panel: Other Recess-No Recess); The Great Recession and
non–recessionary periods (middle panel: 08 Recess-No Recess) and The Great Recession and other re-
cessionary periods (right panel: 08 Recess-Other Recess) respectively. Recessionary periods are NBER
recession dates. We compute the difference in average impulse response as follows: for each draw of the
Gibbs sampler, we average the impulse response over each of the selected periods, take the difference
between the averages of selected periods and then calculate the quantiles over the draws. A liquidity
shock constitutes a decline in market liquidity (i.e. an increase in illiquidity).
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A TVP VAR Model Including Corporate Bond Spreads
In this section we extend upon our model in the main body of the paper and account for credit
risk. To proxy credit risk we use the corporate bond spread, which we measure as the difference
between Moody’s BAA and AAA corporate bond yields; available from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. Justiniano et al. (2015) show that both credit market shocks and housing
market disturbances are required in order to explain the recent US experience, and match the
data. Therefore, omitting credit risk may over exaggerate the impact of our liquidity proxies in
the counterfactual structural variance decomposition and influence impulse response analysis.
To investigate further, we estimate a 6 variable TVP VAR model as in (3)–(8) including
Moody’s BAA-AAA corporate bond yield spread. The results below correspond to the same
priors we impose on the system in the main text, variables enter the VAR in the following
manner: inflation, pit; real GDP growth, yt; the Federal Funds rate, it; house market illiquidity,
H illiqt ; corporate bond spread, CRt; and stock market illiquidity, S
illiq
t respectively. For the
sake of brevity, we do not report convergence diagnostics for the model; however inefficiency
factors remain uniformly low. Furthermore, note that the main messages from this analysis
are consistent to different orderings of our financial variables. We postulate that shocks to the
corporate bond spread capture worsening credit conditions, which in turn depress real GDP
growth.
Figure C.6 plots the posterior median and one standard deviation percentiles of the stochas-
tic volatility of our liquidity and credit risk shocks. In general, the volatility of credit risk
shocks surge temporarily in conjunction with the 1999 recession, the period following the burst
of the dot-com bubble and the Great Recession respectively. Furthermore, notice the persistent
increases from 2005–2009; which implies our model may be picking up disturbances in credit
markets before the crash in 2008. Note also that the shape and time-variation in the volatility
of our structural liquidity shocks remain similar to Figure 3 in the main text.
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Figure C.6: Stochastic Volatility of Liquidity and Credit Risk Shocks from 1981 to
2014
Notes: This figure shows the median and 1 standard deviation percentiles of the time-varying standard
deviations of structural liquidity and credit risk shocks for stock market illiquidity, Silliqt ; the corporate
bond spread, CRt and house market illiquidity, Hilliqt from 1981-2014 respectively. Grey bars indicate
NBER recession dates.
In Figure C.7 we plot the posterior median impulse response functions of real GDP growth
for every quarter in our sample (i.e. 1981Q3-2014Q4) with respect to liquidity and credit risk
shocks. The response of GDP growth with respect to credit risk shocks is in the middle panel
of Figure C.7. We can see that shocks to credit risks yield considerable contractions to real
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GDP growth. The impact of credit risk shocks is greatest immediately following the 2001
recession. Notably, posterior credible intervals (68%) do not include zero for every impulse
response function for up to 6 quarters. Turning our attention to the impact of stock and house
market liquidity shocks, the shape and profile of the posterior median response of GDP for
every observation remains consistent with Figure 4 in the main text.
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Figure C.7: Impact of Liquidity and Credit Risk Shocks on GDP growth 1981 to
2014
Notes: This figure plots the median impulse response functions of US real GDP growth with respect to:
a unit stock market liquidity shock; a unit credit risk shock and a unit house market liquidity shock
respectively. We plot the response along a 5-year horizon for each quarter of our sample 1981Q3-2014Q4.
A liquidity shock constitutes a decline in market liquidity (i.e. an increase in illiquidity).
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We show in Figure C.8 the difference in average impulse response functions of real GDP
growth to liquidity and credit risk shocks respectively. This is analogous to Figure 5 in the main
text and we compute in the exact same manner. Again, the implications are similar to our main
results. However, the response of real GDP growth to stock market liquidity shocks is stronger
and more persistent in other recessions within our sample (see the top left panel of Figure C.8).
This result is unsurprising and intuitive from Figure C.7, since GDP growth becomes more
resilient to stock market liquidity shocks throughout time. Adding to this, liquidity shocks in
the US housing sector are stronger and more persistent in the most recent recession (see the
bottom middle and right panels of Figure C.8) which is consistent with our main analysis. Note
also that our analysis in the middle panel of Figure C.8 reports no difference in the sensitivity
of GDP growth to credit risk shocks (on average) within our sample.
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Figure C.8: Impulse Responses of GDP growth: Differences in averages over peri-
ods
Notes: Panels one to three show the averages of differences in impulse responses of GDP growth to
liquidity and credit risk shocks between: other recessionary (i.e. NBER recession dates excluding the
Great Recession) and non–recessionary periods (left panel: Other Recess-No Recess); The Great Re-
cession and non–recessionary periods (middle panel: 08 Recess-No Recess) and The Great Recession
and other recessionary periods (right panel: 08 Recess-Other Recess) respectively. Recessionary periods
are NBER recession dates. We compute the difference in average impulse response as follows: for each
draw of the Gibbs sampler, we average the impulse response over each of the selected periods, take the
difference between the averages of selected periods and then calculate the quantiles over the draws. A
liquidity shock constitutes a decline in market liquidity (i.e. an increase in illiquidity).
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A final factor to consider is the robustness of our structural variance decomposition. There
is a possibility the financial and asset variables we include in our main model are picking up
important information from credit markets. For example, a relaxation (contraction) in credit
conditions can aid (hinder) prosperity in the housing market when borrowing constraints are
not (are) binding (see Mian and Sufi (2009), Iacoviello and Neri (2010)). Without explicitly
accounting for credit risk, there may be over emphasis in the importance of our house market
liquidity shocks for the overall variation in GDP growth29. Similarly, Justiniano et al. (2015)
find that credit shocks are not enough to solely explain the Great Recession and fragile recovery
for the US; disturbances in the housing market are thought to help match the data.
Therefore, we follow Benati and Mumtaz (2007) and perform a counterfactual structural
variance decomposition of US Real GDP growth directly comparable to Figure 6 in the main
body. Figure C.9 reports the time-varying contributions, which we express as the median and
one standard deviation percentiles of the distributions, of: stock market liquidity shocks (top
panel); credit risk shocks (middle panel); and house market liquidity shocks (bottom panel), to
the overall variation in Real GDP growth respectively. The following analysis and comments
are with regards to the posterior median estimates of the distributions of our structural variance
decomposition. Clearly there is a considerable amount of time-variation in the contributions of
our structural liquidity and credit risk shocks.
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Figure C.9: Contribution of Structural Liquidity and Credit Risk Shocks to the
Overall Variance of Real GDP Growth from 1981 to 2014
Notes: This figure plots the median and one standard deviation percentiles of the contribution of struc-
tural stock market liquidity, credit risk, and house market liquidity shocks to real GDP growth from
1981 to 2014. Grey bars indicate NBER recession dates.
It is evident that the contributions of stock market liquidity shocks are episodic in nature.
Notably, a significant fraction of GDP growth variance (i.e. around 20%) is attributable to stock
market liquidity shocks from 1987–1992; corresponding well with the crash of the stock market
in 1987 preceding the savings and loan crisis. Furthermore note that in the 2001 recession the
stock market is the main driver of GDP growth variance. Moving on to the most recent recession,
stock market liquidity shocks contribute 39% to the overall variance in GDP in 2008Q4 before
declining sharply to around 5% following the Great Recession.
In addition, the contribution of credit risk shocks to GDP growth variance surges–particularly
29Although corporate bond spreads do not explicitly capture credit conditions households face, they will give
an indication of credit conditions within an economy.
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in the earlier years of our sample–with NBER recession dates. Then, following the 2001 reces-
sion, the contribution of credit risk shocks increases to around 43%. From 2005 until late 2009,
credit risk shocks are shown to contribute around 20% to the variance in GDP. The deteri-
oration in credit conditions during this time period links well with the findings in Gilchrist
and Zakrajˇsek (2012). Combining the former with the increase in sub-prime mortgage lending,
helps explain why both the contributions of house market liquidity shocks and credit risk shocks
surge in the late 2000s prior to the Great Recession (Mian and Sufi, 2009; Iacoviello and Neri,
2010). Turning our attention to the bottom panel, we can see substantial time-variation in
the contribution of house market liquidity shocks. Notably, the changing contributions is much
more gradual than stock market liquidity and credit risk shocks.
On average during the most recent recession, stock market liquidity shocks explain 17%;
credit risk shocks explain 12%, and house market liquidity shocks explain 24% of the variance
in GDP growth respectively. Therefore the total average contribution of liquidity and credit
risk shocks is 53%. Overall, the shapes of the changing contributions, resemble the stochastic
volatility plots this model implies. Therefore the driving force of time-variation in the contri-
butions are changing shock sizes. Interestingly, both this, and the analysis in the main text
uncovers an important role for the stock market in the most recent recession. Contrasting to
Prieto et al. (2016) and Justiniano et al. (2015), our analysis reveals that once isolating the
liquidity component from stock prices, the stock market is a key explanatory factor for US
GDP growth variance during recessions; particularly during 2008 and 2009. This implies that
once accounting for stock market conditions through prices and quantities, there is a credible
link between the stock market and GDP growth during times of recession.
These results reveal an important structural and episodic relationship between both stock
market liquidity shocks and real GDP fluctuations, and credit risk shocks and real GDP vari-
ation. To contrast we uncover that the contributions of house market liquidity shocks to GDP
growth variance change smoothly in conjunction with changing shock sizes hitting the system
throughout time. Combining with the conclusions we report in the main text, this analysis
reveals that the impact and real effects liquidity shocks is robust to incorporating credit risk
into the model.
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Highlights 
1. We examine the impact of stock and house market liquidity shocks on US GDP 
over time 
2. Liquidity shocks explain 52% of the variance in GDP over the Great Recession 
3. Results are robust to including uncertainty, credit risk and the broader financial 
sector 
 
